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Abstract
This article deploys a politico-sociological historical analysis in the 
interrogation of the origins, tenacity and resilience of Ndebele particularism 
across pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs in Zimbabwe. While 
the issue of Ndebele particularism is currently overshadowed by the recent 
political and economic crisis that has seen Zimbabwe becoming a pariah 
state, it has continued to haunt both the project of nationalism that ended 
up unravelling along the fault-lines of Ndebele-Shona ethnicities and 
the post-colonial nation-building process that became marred by ethnic 
tensions and violence of the 1980s. In this article, Ndebele particularism 
is described at two main levels. Firstly, successive pre-colonial, colonial 
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and post-colonial historical processes contributed to the construction and 
consolidation of Ndebele particularism. Secondly, this particularism is a 
product of coalescence of grievance and resentment to Shona triumphalism. 
The politico-sociological historical analysis is intertwined with a social 
constructivist perspective of understanding complex politics of identities in 
general. The discussion is taken up to the current reverberation of Ndebele 
particularistic politics on the internet including the creation of a virtual 
community known as United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR) that symbolises 
the desire for a restored pre-colonial Ndebele nation in the mould of 
Swaziland and Lesotho.
Introduction
Zimbabwe is one entity and shall never be separated into different 
entities. It’s impossible. I am saying this because there are some people 
who are saying let’s do what Lesotho did. There is no Lesotho here. 
There is one Zimbabwe and one Zimbabwe only. (Robert Mugabe, The 
Sunday Mail, 20 November 2005)
In May 2007 the former Governor and Resident Minister of Matabeleland 
North, Welshman Mabhena, wrote a letter to the British Ambassador in 
Harare as a ‘Notice of intent to file an application for the review of the 
verdict of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Land Case 
Matabeleland on the 19th of 1918.’ In the letter Mabhena (2007) wrote:
Your excellence you may be surprised to hear that I usually get lost 
when I come across people who mix up my country Matabeleland with 
Zimbabwe, because Zimbabwe is a former British Colony which was 
colonised in 1890 and granted independence on 18 April 1980. While 
my homeland Matabeleland is a territory which was an independent 
Kingdom until it was invaded by the British South Africa Company 
(BSA Co) on 4 November 1893, in defiance of the authority of Her 
Majesty Queen Victoria. Actually in terms of the Moffat Treaty of 
Peace and Unity of 11 February 1888 between Queen Victoria and 
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King Lobengula, Britain and Matabeleland were allies, and due to our 
respect to our late King we have not renounced his vow.
Working within the auspices of the organisation known as Umhlahlo we Sizwe 
sika Mthwakazi dedicated to the restoration of an autonomous Kingdom 
of Matabeleland, Mabhena has progressed to file a legal case for review of 
the verdict of the judicial council of the Privy Council on the land case of 
Matabeleland on the 19th of July 1918 by the British Government. What is 
of historical interest here is what is termed ‘the thesis of the plight of the 
people of Matabeleland and its remedy’ which outlines the constitutional 
history within which the people of Matabeleland were colonised and their 
sovereignty taken away. This is how the case is put forward:
The Respondent is the SOVEREIGN OF THE BRITISH CROWN a 
colonial power which granted the ‘Royal Charter of Incorporation to 
the BSA Co.’ and conferred it with all the powers of a government 
on all lands north of the Limpopo River. After the conquest of the 
Kingdom of Matabeleland on 4th of November 1893 the Respondent 
did legalise the contraband deal of the BSA Co. pioneers, referred to 
as the ‘Victoria Agreement of 14 August 1893’ which was a scheme of 
displacing the people of Matabeleland and loot their cattle. I also submit 
that the Respondent went further to legalise the said contraband contract 
through the proclamation of the Matabeleland Order-in-Council on 19th 
of July 1894…The Respondent further ruled through the verdict of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1918 that: ‘The Ndebele 
Sovereignty had been broken up and replaced by a new, better system 
as defined by the Matabeleland Order-in-Council of 1894’.
After the above judgement had usurped the Sovereignty of the Kingdom 
of Matabeleland through the said Order which replaced our statehood, 
the Respondent again through the 1923 Constitution of Southern 
Rhodesia, did confer the jurisdiction to the white supremacy regimes 
who were comprised of its descendants, the power of reigning over us 
through conquest, using the legal bases of the said Order, an act which 
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continued to seriously prejudice our wellbeing for a duration which 
accrued to a total of 87 years under racial domination.
In 1980 again the Respondent went further to use the said Order as the 
legal basis of simultaneously decolonising Mashonaland with the status 
of an independent Republic of Zimbabwe, to which it consequently 
transferred the mandate of ruling us, in Matabeleland by conquest to 
black majority supremacy regime comprising of Shona tribe through 
‘The Constitution Order 1980 (S.I. 1980 of the United Kingdom) made 
19th March 1980.’ an act which has perpetuated tribal domination for 
27 years bringing the duration of repression in Matabeleland to a total 
114 years.1 
This case indicates the current embers in the politics of Ndebele particularism 
and the current drive for the restoration of an autonomous Ndebele nation 
separate from Zimbabwe. This article, therefore, interrogates the history 
behind the origins and resilience of Ndebele particularism – that makes it 
refuse to be swallowed by current territorial nationalism. 
The Ndebele of Zimbabwe are variously described as a tribe, a clan and 
an ethnic group. But Ndebele novelists and culturalists, including active 
promoters of Ndebele particularism and advocates of the restoration of the 
pre-colonial Ndebele kingdom, prefer to use the term nation instead of tribe.2 
The idea of the Ndebele as a distinctive nation inevitably threatens Shona 
hegemony that became triumphant in 1980 when the Zimbabwe African 
National – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the former liberation movement that 
1 An application for the review of the verdict of the judicial committee of the privy council 
in the land case of Matabeleland on the 19th July 1918, with the view to ascertain its 
jurisdiction and to hear the demand of the people of Matabeleland who are praying for the 
revocation of the Matabeleland order-in-council of the 18th July 1894 with the subsequent 
restoration of the kingdom of Matabeleland and the accompanying restitutions. 
2 Among the leading promoters of Ndebele particularism and advocates of the restora-
tion of the pre-colonial Ndebele kingdom is the former Governor of Matabeleland North, 
Welshman Mabhena, once a leading nationalist and resident minister under ZANU-PF and 
a radical Diaspora-based grouping known as Mthwakazi People’s Congress (MPC).
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was dominated by the Shona-speaking people, came to power. As noted in 
the epigraph above, Robert Mugabe has ruled out as impossible the idea of 
the realisation of a restored and autonomous Ndebele nation in the mould 
of Swaziland and Lesotho. But throughout the liberation struggle, Ndebele-
speaking people stuck with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). 
Whose support base and military wing were dominated by people from the 
south-western part of Zimbabwe.3 Ndebele historians like Pathisa Nyathi 
prefer to use the term uMthwakazi for the Ndebele nation as it is done by the 
radical UK-based Mthwakazi People’s Congress (MPC).4 
This article starts by engaging with some theoretical and definitional issues 
including contested interpretations of who qualifies as a Ndebele in context 
of a society characterised by assimilation and incorporation of people 
from different ethnic groups into the Ndebele state. This process proceeds 
right from Mzilikazi Khumalo’s (the founder of the Ndebele) migration 
from Nguniland to his final settlement on the south-western part of the 
Zimbabwean plateau in the late 1830s. The article engages with the historical 
processes that continued to reproduce Ndebele particularism right across 
the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. 
Theoretical and interpretive framework
A leading anthropologist, John Comaroff (1997), provided five theoretical 
propositions relevant to understand issues of ethnic identities in general. 
His first proposition was that ethnicity was constructed by specific historical 
forces which are simultaneously structural and cultural. He posits that 
ethnicity was never a unitary phenomenon because it described both a 
set of relations and a mode of consciousness that was ever changing. As a 
form of consciousness, ethnicity was one among many socially constructed 
3 ZAPU recruited and mobilised its supporters mainly from Matabeleland since the time of 
the nationalist split of 1963 that gave birth to a Shona dominated ZANU that concentrated 
its recruitment in Mashonaland.  
4 There is no clear definition of what uMthwakazi means. Some people think it is derived 
from uMutwa—a Ndebele name for the original inhabitants of Southern African known as 
the San. See Nyathi 1994, 1996 and 1999.
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phenomena that included totemism, each of which emerged within 
particular historical structures. Comaroff ’s third proposition was that 
while totemism emerged with the establishment of symmetrical relations 
between structurally similar social groupings which may or may not come 
to be integrated into one political community, ethnicity had its origins in 
the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a 
single political economy. The fourth proposition was that while ethnicity 
was the product of a specific historical process, it tended to take on the 
‘natural’ appearance of an autonomous force and a ‘principle’ capable of 
determining the course of social life. The final proposition was that ethnicity 
as an objectified ‘principle' of collective consciousness of society, could be 
perpetuated by factors quite different from those that caused its emergence 
and could also develop a direct and independent impact on the context in 
which it arose (Comaroff 1997:69-85).
These are useful propositions that point to ethnicity as a socio-political 
constructed phenomenon emphasising that the process of construction is 
mediated and shaped by specifiable historical factors. Comaroff (1997:83) 
concludes:
The major problem, in both theoretical and empirical terms, it seems 
to me, is not to account for the genesis and persistence – or even the 
transformation – of ethnic consciousness and affiliation. Once ethnicity 
is understood to exist as a set of human relations, a product of specifiable 
historical forces and processes rather than a primordial ‘given,’ those 
issues become readily understandable. 
This argument tallies with Leroy Vail (1989:xi) who stated that: ‘If ethnic 
consciousness was a product of historical experience, then its creation 
and elaboration would be a proper subject of enquiry for historians.’ With 
specific focus on the Ndebele, Bjorn Lindgren (2004:5-8) attempted to take 
into account what he termed ‘historically formed specificity of ethnicity’ 
and ‘internal dynamics of ethnicity’ in Matabeleland. He focused on clan 
names and castes in Matabeleland, arguing that Ndebele speakers use 
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various clan names, origins, and ‘castes’ in a practice of naming and that 
these internal processes and ‘practices break the category Ndebele into parts’ 
(Lindgren 2004:5). Lindgren’s interests were on smaller units of analysis 
like izibongo (surnames/clan names) as another avenue towards a more 
complex understanding of Ndebele ethnicity (Lindgren 2004). Lindgren’s 
intervention ended with him trying to deploy the ephemeral izibongo (clan 
names/surnames) that need explanation in themselves as a scientific concept 
that could explain Ndebele identity. Ndebele izibongo are a very complex 
phenomenon on their own and have a complex history of their own for one 
to simplistically deploy as a concept to understand identity. For instance, in 
Matabeleland the isibongo Ndlovu is not signifying a single clan group. There 
are Ndlovu (Gatsheni) who are Nguni, Ndlovu (Gabula) who are Kalanga, 
Ndlovu (Mthombeni) who are Nguni and other Ndlovus with various ethnic 
origins. So one cannot use and take isibongo Ndlovu to mean a single clan 
and then quickly assign ethnic origin to the concept (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2004). On top of this there were numerous people of Lozwi-Shona origin 
who used their own agency to translate their original Shona surnames into 
Ndlovu. The reality is that one finds numerous Ndlovus in Matabeleland and 
the Midlands regions sharing a common totem (elephant) but not tracing 
their descent from common clans or ethnic groups. 
Totemic politics need explanation and cannot be deployed casually to enlighten 
debates on ethnicity in Matabeleland. Lindgren relied heavily on the works 
of white literate observers and early white writers who simplistically failed to 
go beyond the totem to the clan name in their definition of who was Ndebele 
and who was not (Hughes 1956; Child 1969). Ngwabi Bhebe, a historian, has 
shown that a number of people of Shona origin who were assimilated into 
the Ndebele state tended to Ndebele-lise their Shona surnames. Examples 
included Shiri becoming Tshili, Mhofu becoming Mpofu, Zhou becoming 
Ndlovu, Hungwe becoming Nyoni (Bhebhe 1979). Therefore, an approach 
to understanding Ndebele ethnicity based on izibongo rides roughshod over 
complex histories and complex processes of social engineering that took place 
in the Ndebele state. Lindgren ended up reviving the old fashioned idea of the 
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Ndebele nation being divided into castes. This is how he put it (Lindgren 
2004:13):
The isibongo places an individual within one of these categories of 
origin, and thereby within one of the three categories denoting ‘caste’: 
the Zansi, the Enhla and the Lozwi (or Holi).
The discourse of castes just like that of izibongo ignores historical factors 
and social fluidities within the Ndebele state. For instance, the term Zansi 
literally meant the South in geographic sense while Enhla literally means the 
North. It also denotes direction. But Lozwi is a form of ethnic identity of a 
branch of Shona people who belonged to the Rozvi state that dominated 
the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau prior to the arrival of 
the Ndebele. This means that at one level people in the Ndebele state were 
categorised according to where they came from with the abeZansi (those 
from the South) forming an aristocratic grouping, the abeNhla (those from 
the North) constituting a second layer of grouping, and those assimilated 
from the Rozvi state forming the Holi grouping.5
Terence Ranger (1994b:10) defined identity in Matabeleland at two levels. 
The first was what he termed the ‘generous’ and ‘inclusive’ and the second 
was what he described as the ‘narrow’ and xenophobic. The formation and 
consolidation of the Ndebele state was predicated on the generous and 
inclusive assimilationist policy where Ndebele language became a common 
signifier of identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The Ndebele were active in 
defining and articulating their identity in positive terms of a strong nation. 
And their neighbouring Shona communities also engaged in defining the 
Ndebele as a tribe that only expanded through forcible assimilation of 
captured Shona people, the majority of whom were given Ndebele-oriented 
animal totems as surnames. What Ranger termed the narrow and xenophobic 
conception of Ndebele identity was also promoted by the Shona groups 
5 It is not yet well established by historians what the term Holi/Hole literally meant. Some 
argue that it was derived from amaholingubo (those with long dresses touching the 
ground), a reference to the style of clothes put on by the Rozvi. 
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for counter-hegemonic purposes. In this scheme of things, the Ndebele 
were reduced to Ngunis who were identifiable through such surnames as 
Khumalo, Mkwananzi, Gumede, Mafu, Gatsheni and Mathema.6 
So far there are many versions of Ndebele identity that have mushroomed in 
recent years. The most narrow and ill-informed of them all is that one that 
reduces being Ndebele to being members of the Khumalo clan that con-
stituted itself as the ruling elite under Mzilikazi and Lobengula Khumalo. 
This is a clannish definition that fails to take into account the complex 
processes of nation building evolved by Mzilikazi who continually added 
new groups into the lower echelons of the original Khumalo clan. The second 
version is one that defined Ndebele-ness linguistically – as comprising any 
one who spoke Ndebele language as a mother tongue. Then there is the 
regional-local definition that defines a Ndebele as any person residing in 
Matabeleland or the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. This I will call the 
regional-geographic definition of being Ndebele. To those with a hegemonic 
Ndebele agenda, being a Ndebele means a conglomeration of all those people 
whose ancestors were assimilated into the Ndebele state, be they of Nguni, 
Sotho, Shona, Kalanga, Tonga, Tswana, Venda or Lozwi extraction. This 
historical-pluralistic-hegemonic definition of being Ndebele celebrates the 
Ndebele nation as a pre-colonial form of a rainbow nation. The most recent 
definition was concocted during the post-colonial era and in the midst of 
violence that engulfed Matabeleland and the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe 
in the period 1980-1987. During this period being Ndebele was limited to 
being loyal to Joshua Nkomo and PF-ZAPU, the former liberation movement 
that became an opposition after 1980 (Sibanda 2005). This political definition 
had the immediate impact of uniting all those who were brutalised by the 
Fifth Brigade, not only as a dissident community as ZANU-PF and Robert 
Mugabe defined them, but also as a victimised and unwanted community 
that had to look for a state of their own (Msindo 2004). This definition took 
the form of post-colonial re-tribalisation and provincialisation of Ndebele 
identity that was initiated by the state in the period 1980-1987. Its message 
was very simple: ‘ZAPU is connected with dissidents and ZAPU is Ndebele 
6  This is an attempt to reduce Ndebele identity to barely a handful of clans.
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therefore the Ndebele are dissidents’ (Abrams 2006:60). As put by Enos 
Nkala, Nkomo was then the modern Ndebele king (BBC 1983). 
Since 1980, the Ndebele identity continued to undergo a continuous 
process of minoritisation as Shona identity picked the agenda of hegemonic 
triumphalism. Finex Ndhlovu, a language specialist based in Australia, 
argued that the notion of ethnic minorities is a highly contested subject 
that cannot be fully explained in terms of demographic facts alone as 
it is indexically linked to struggles over socio-political power, cultural 
domination and control (Ndhlovu 2006:1). He explored how discursive 
practices underwriting the hegemony of dominating ethnic groups like the 
Shona, the use of languages as markers of ethnic and national identity, as 
well as the appropriation and abuse of the terminology such as ‘minority’ 
and ‘majority’ are deployed in Zimbabwe in pursuit of exclusionary political 
agendas (Ndhlovu 2006:1). 
One can define the Ndebele as an ethnic group as well as a nation. But 
Stephen Barbour (2001:7) tried to differentiate an ethnic group from a 
nation in this way:
Unlike a nation, an ethnic group need not occupy a territory. Also, 
unlike a nation, its ‘common myths and historical memories’ may be 
more plausible; since ethnic groups may be much smaller than modern 
nations…And, rather than a ‘mass, public culture’ uniting very disparate 
elements, there may be high level of shared cultural norms; and there is 
usually a shared language.
All these complex definitions cannot make sense outside a properly nuanced 
interrogation of specific historical processes that continued to enact, produce 
and reproduce Ndebele particularism. 
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Historical interpretation of the construction of Ndebele 
Identity
Ndebele particularistic ethnic identity has a pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial origin. Its origins are lodged within the complex nation-building 
project initiated by King Mzilikazi Khumalo and taken further by his son 
and successor King Lobengula Khumalo. The Rhodesia settler-colonial state 
was not an innocent bystander in this process and the Shona-dominated 
post-colonial Zimbabwean state also shared in this process.7 What is not 
in doubt is that Ndebele identity is a product of complex constructivist 
processes that span pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs.8 A 
historically informed, careful and nuanced analysis of the evolution of 
Ndebele particularism should take into account such concrete historical 
factors as the Mfecane Revolution and Nguni-Sotho nation building strategies 
of the 1820s, as well as the role of colonialists and African nationalists in 
pushing the evolution of the country towards self-determination along 
bifurcated ethnic lines. Post-independence events like the connection of 
Shona triumphalism with Gukurahundi atrocities; the limits of the Unity 
Accord, the death of Joshua Nkomo and the current Zimbabwe crisis with 
its displacement of many people and the resultant formation of exile-based 
diasporic communities obsessed with identity politics need to be analysed 
and factored into the understanding of Ndebele identity politics. 
It was the superior art of nation building displayed by Mzilikazi Khumalo 
that led the historian John D. Omer-Cooper (1966:8) to present the Mfecane 
as a positive process of political change and a ‘revolution in Bantu Africa’. 
Despite the vigorous revisions of the Mfecane by Julian Cobbing in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and his attempt to ‘jettison’ the Mfecane from Southern African 
History, no one has disputed that this revolution was marked by creative 
statecraft that led to the emergence of such new political and social formations 
7 Terence Ranger, who previously emphasised the colonial ‘inventedness’ of Ndebele 
identity, later accepted the pre-colonial ‘inventedness’ of Ndebele identity in his Voices 
from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe (Ranger 
1999:99ff). 
8 See Ranger 1985, 1993 and 1994a. 
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such as the Ndebele in the highveld of South Africa (Cobbing 1988).9 The 
process unfolded in terms of how a small Khumalo clan expanded into a 
nation and how a small Khumalo ruling elite managed to broadcast its power 
over people of different ethnic groups. Mzilikazi employed such strategies as 
raiding, conquest, assimilation and the incorporation of individuals, groups 
and communities. It included inculcating Ndebele values and language over 
people of different ethnic groups (Cobbing 1976). By the time of Ndebele 
permanent settlement on the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau 
after 1840, what had started as a small Khumalo clan had snowballed over 
time into a heterogeneous nation consisting of different groups. On how 
the Ndebele won a sizeable number of Sotho and Tswana communities 
into their nascent state, Margaret Kinsman argued that the presence of the 
Ndebele on the western highveld from 1826 to 1838 introduced a period of 
ambiguous peace rather than devastation. The Ndebele managed to push 
out the Griqua, Kora and other brigands that subsisted on raiding the Sotho 
and the Tswana. This atmosphere attracted some of these communities to 
join the Ndebele on their own volition.10
It was the Boer Trekkers, trekking from the Cape Colony in what became 
known as the Great Trek, who used firearms in their constant attacks on 
the Ndebele and eventually forced Mzilikazi to migrate to the Zimbabwean 
plateau (Pretorius & Kruger 1937; Tylden 1953). On reaching the Zimbabwean 
plateau, the process of nation building continued in the form of conquest, 
assimilation and incorporation of Lozwi, Kalanga, Birwa, Tonga, Nyubi, 
Venda, and Suthu inhabitants of the south-west. It was those people of the 
south-western part of the Zimbabwe plateau who constituted the third 
9 See also extended debates on the Mfecane in Hamilton 1995.
10 See Kinsman 1995, where details are given on how some Sotho and Tswana communities 
voluntarily joined the Ndebele and how some were attached and forcibly incorporated into 
the Ndebele state. 
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segment in the Ndebele state known as abaLozwi or amaHole.11 Lindgren 
(2005) correctly noticed a basic feature of Ndebele ethnicity: that it was built 
on multiple origins that were ordered in a hierarchy of belonging. A Ndebele 
may be of Nguni, Sotho, Tswana, Khalanga, Venda, Tonga and/or Shona 
origin. Commenting on this arrangement and organisation of the Ndebele 
state, Sithole wrote, ‘It would seem then, that the social system among the 
Ndebele was a ‘porous’ or ‘flexible’ rather than rigid caste system’ (Sithole 
1995:130). The uniting factor was the language known as IsiNdebele. 
The best way to understand Ndebele ethnic identity is as a socially 
constructed phenomenon, not as a fixed primordial identity. It must be 
understood as the protean outcome of the continuous and generally conflict-
ridden interaction of political, economic and cultural forces both external 
and internal to developing ethnic communities (Berman 1998:310). Jocelyn 
Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger in their book Violence and 
Memory: One Hundred Years in the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland (Alexander 
et al 2000) captured how violence and its memory shaped the history and 
identity of the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. They explored in detail how 
the interconnections of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, Ndebele resistance 
against colonial forces as well as the assaults on the Ndebele by the post-
colonial forces contributed to the reinforcement of Ndebele identity. What 
has not been explored is the issue of how the Ndebele continued to promote 
their ‘particularism’ within the colonial state and even after the achievement 
of independence. This particularism refers to the rendition of a separate 
Ndebele history which is different from the Shona historical experiences, 
the attempts to revive Ndebele kingship, and the continual formation of 
Ndebele particularistic organisations up to the mass nationalism phase of 
Zimbabwean history.
11 AbaLozwi were part of the Rozvi state ruled over by the Mambos (rulers). This Rozvi 
state was found by the Ndebele already tottering and breaking into smaller chieftaincies. 
As such the Rozvi people were not able to offer united resistance to the Ndebele invaders 
from the South. The Ndebele assumed that all the people of the South-west were under 
Rozvi rule before they came hence they labelled those assimilated into the Ndebele state 
on the Zimbabwean plateau amaLozwi. 
Nation Building in Zimbabwe
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
40
Colonialism, nationalism and Ndebele particularism
The colonialists did not ‘invent’ Ndebele ethnic identity; they ‘reconstructed’ 
it for colonial purposes. By the time of colonial rule, the Ndebele state had 
existed as a centralised political reality in the south-western part of the 
Zimbabwean plateau with people who were conscious of being Ndebele and 
who spoke IsiNdebele as their national language (Cobbing 1976; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2004). The Ndebele existed as an independent nation up to 1893 
when King Lobengula was violently removed from power by the British 
colonialists. While Mashonaland was occupied in 1890 by the Pioneer 
Column that culminated in the raising of the Union Jack Flag in Fort 
Salisbury in September 1890, the Ndebele state remained independent for 
the next four years. Colonial rule was extended from Mashonaland to the 
Ndebele state after the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 where the Ndebele forces 
tried to resist the invasion of their state by Cecil John Rhodes’s imperialist 
forces (Glass 1968). This led the historian Arthur Keppel-Jones (1983:8-11) 
to argue that Mashonaland was ‘occupied’ and Matabeleland was ‘conquered.’ 
The heroic charge of the Ndebele against the colonial forces’ encampments 
at the Shangani and Mbembesi Rivers was inscribed into Ndebele national 
memory. The disappearance of the king was also captured as a Ndebele 








[The world is changing; things were not like this in the olden days.
The reigning kings were Mambo and Mzilikazi.
But when we fought at Tshangane River,
12 This popular song is a summary of how the Ndebele perceived the conquest of their state 
and how their lives were changing. It is a song that clearly indicates the Ndebele aware-
ness of changing circumstances and what it meant to their nationhood. 
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And we fell on our knees,
King Lobengula then disappeared.]
This song encapsulated how the Ndebele as a nation understood the impact of 
colonial rule and the changing circumstances brought about by colonialism, 
particularly the disappearance of black kings and their replacement by 
white rulers. Despite the disappearance of their king in 1893, the Ndebele 
were able to use their remaining institutions to rise against the colonising 
chartered British South Africa Company in March 1896.13 All this indicates 
the resilience and cohesiveness of the Ndebele nation and its level of political 
consciousness together with their desire to restore their sovereignty (Cobbing 
1977; Beech 1986; Ranger 1967). The surrender of the Ndebele in 1896 was 
facilitated through negotiations (Indaba) at Matopos Hills where Cecil John 
Rhodes made some promises to the Ndebele which included giving them 
seeds for farming and the return of some originally looted cattle to the 
Ndebele chiefs (Ranger 1999). This means that the Ndebele even emerged 
from the Uprising of 1896 as a cohesive nation. This lasted up until the time 
of the massive evictions of the Ndebele from areas around Bulawayo to far 
away areas, which opened the way for white commercial farming in the 
1920s and after the Second World War (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). 
Since the colonial conquest, the Ndebele have not given up the dream of 
re-establishing themselves as a nation with a new king as its head. Terence 
Ranger, in The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, provides details on 
how in the period 1898-1930 the Ndebele formed what he described as 
protest movements that were partly looking towards accommodation 
with the structures of the colonial states and partly campaigning for a 
separate homeland (Ranger 1970). The main voice fighting for a separate 
Ndebele homeland was Lobengula’s son Nyamande Khumalo who played a 
leading role in the formation of the National Home Movement which was 
succeeded by the Matabele Home Society after his death (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2007:183-184). In recent years Ray S. Roberts has interrogated the history of 
13 The issue of the disappearance of the king is discussed in Lindgren 2002a. See also 
Lindgren 2002b.
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Khumalo royal family focusing on the sons of King Lobengula, the roles they 
played in Ndebele protest movements during the colonial period and how 
the colonial state treated them. Though he tries to critique Ranger’s concept 
of the ‘African voice’ by arguing that the story of Lobengula’s other sons 
(with the exception of Nyamanda), particularly Nguboyenja Khumalo, was 
not of great importance politically, his articulation of Matabeleland politics 
in the light of Lobengula’s family indicates how the Ndebele still aspired to 
be a nation, how they were conscious of their identity and how they still 
looked to the sons of Lobengula as leaders of the Ndebele nation (Roberts 
1984; Roberts 2005). For instance, Rhodes Lobengula Khumalo, one of the 
sons of Lobengula, was active in the Matabele Home Society, introduced 
football and boxing as sports to Bulawayo and continued the fight to protect 
Ndebele interests (Roberts 2005:38). While the Ndebele associations, from 
the National Home Movement, the Matabele Home Society to the Mzilikazi 
Family Association, might have somewhat chequered histories, they indicated 
the level of consciousness of the Ndebele and their attempt to maintain a 
particularistic identity within the confines of the colonial state. Enocent 
Msindo analysed how Ndebele attacked the Shona working and residing in 
Bulawayo in 1929 as part of Ndebele claims to Bulawayo as their city even 
though it was now run by the colonial regime. Despite being colonised, the 
Ndebele still viewed Bulawayo as their city, deriving ammunition from its 
pre-colonial history as isigodlo (the capital city) of the Ndebele state. Msindo 
(2006:433) made this point clear when he wrote that: 
This fossilisation, in a settlement previously a Ndebele pre-colonial 
headquarters, of ‘foreign’ languages, different ethnicities and modes of 
behaviour, explains why it took a heavy and protracted struggle for the 
Ndebele and other inhabitants of Matabeleland to ‘regain’ Bulawayo. 
Throughout the colonial period up to the time of the rise of the mass 
nationalist movements, the Ndebele had tried very hard to maintain a certain 
level of particularism. The colonial state reinforced this development of 
particularism by dividing the country into ethnic names like Matabeleland, 
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Mashonaland and Manicaland. Bruce J. Berman (1998:315) commented on 
this colonial development in this way:
Each administrative unit ideally contained a single culturally and 
linguistically homogeneous ‘tribe’ in which people continued to live 
within the indigenous institutions and were subject to ‘tribal discipline’ 
through local structures of authority. The imperatives of control thus 
also constrained the transformation of African societies and indeed, 
made what the colonial state understood to be the local institutions of 
tribe and kinship into grassroots foundations of colonial domination, 
as well as a means by which it could derive a degree of legitimacy from 
association with ‘traditional’ social forces.14
Ndebele particularism continued to reverberate within the colonial state to 
the extent that the Matabele Home Society successfully lobbied and agitated 
for name-change of Rufaro Township into Njube Township (Roberts 2005). 
Rufaro was a Shona name for a township at the centre of Bulawayo. Njube 
was one of the sons of Lobengula. This change was owing to the urban work 
of the Matabele Home Society. Roberts concluded that ‘the Home Society, 
the Mzilikazi Family Association, and indeed the Khumalo as traditional 
leaders outside the colonial order, played their part, holding the people of 
western Zimbabwe together, as a nation defined by culture rather than as 
nationalists defined by politics’ (Roberts 2005:37). 
Masipula Sithole, who studied Zimbabwean nationalism from the perspective 
of ethnicity, noted that at the formation of the first mass nationalist 
organisation, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) 
in 1957, the Ndebele-Shona axis emerged, manifesting itself in the words 
exchanged at the founding congress as well as in the structure established 
to lead the party. Conscious effort was made to achieve ethnic or regional 
balance between the Ndebele and the Shona (Sithole 1995:132).15 By 1963, 
a major ethnic rift hit the nationalist politics with the Zimbabwe African 
14 See also Ranger 1985.
15 See also Sithole 1999. 
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People’s Union (ZAPU) splitting along ethnic lines into the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) that was Shona dominated and ZAPU that 
became Ndebele dominated (Nkomo 1984).16 Since that time the history 
of ZAPU and ZANU have become a tale of ethnic politics and tribalism, 
bringing more division than unity to the Ndebele and the Shona. 
The Zimbabwean nationalists carried the burden of trying to balance the 
ethnic factor in their respective political organisations in a bid to gain 
national support and in a bid to manage ethnic differences. Within ZANU 
the burden was how to balance and manage the equally volatile issue of intra-
Shona ethnicities involving Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika and Korekore groups. 
ZAPU had to balance Ndebele-Kalanga-Shona composition and Muzorewa 
and Sithole were engaged in similar processes within their respective 
organisations. Chief Khayisa Ndiweni of Ntabazinduna in Matabeleland 
even went to the extent of forming the United National Federal Party (UNFP) 
that advocated for open power sharing ‘between the two major communities 
in the country’ (Sithole 1986:79-84). 
The recent recurrences of Ndebele particularism
The first crisis that hit the post-colonial nation-building project had to do 
with ethnicity and integration of military forces. A crisis which began in the 
ranks of the military, involving open exchange of fire between the triumphant 
and Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele-dominated ZIPRA in 
Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo), which ignited a reign of 
state terror in Matabeleland and the Midlands region in the period 1980-
1987. The reign of terror that became known as the Gukurahundi campaign 
was ostensibly meant to seek and destroy some ex-ZIPRA combatants who 
had defected from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to embark on a life 
of dissidence. But as noted by Bhebe the violence was somehow an inevitable 
consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist 
armies had been formed. This is how he puts it:
16 Where Nkomo blames Leopold Takawira for fomenting the split on tribal lines. 
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It is not unreasonable for readers to ask how such close allies [as ZANU 
and ZAPU] could be involved in a civil war that saw many lives being lost 
in Matabeleland. On the other hand, to us such a question would only 
show that the reader has not read this book with attention. For the book 
has shown how factional conflict in Zimbabwe, or among Zimbabweans, 
is quite close to the surface. It does not matter whether people belong to 
the same party…The situation is worse when people belong to different 
political parties. The reader saw how ZAPU and ZANU followers started 
killing each other when they were dumped together at Mboroma by the 
Zambian authorities. The ZIPA experiment in Mozambique collapsed 
for just that same reason. In Libya, ZAPU and ZANU were put in the 
same training camps and they killed each other. The reason was very 
simple. These young men and women were trained to hate each other 
by their leaders, who wanted to justify the separate existence of their 
parties. Each party had its own Commissariat Department, whose task 
was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different 
from each other, who the leaders were and how they were different from 
the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the 
cadres were brought up to hate (Bhebe 2004a:256).
The post-colonial period was crucial in the process of furthering Ndebele 
particularism by the state’s use of violence. The ethnically inspired clashes 
between ZIPRA and ZANLA in the Assembly Points, the running away 
of some ex-ZIPRA combatants back to the bush, the exploitation of the 
antagonistic situation by apartheid South Africa via Super ZAPU, and the 
‘discovery’ of arms caches in PF-ZAPU owned farms around Bulawayo, gave 
the Shona-led government a pretext to use state power to crush PF-ZAPU 
once and for all, demonstrate to the Ndebele who was in power and widen 
ZANU-PF control into the south-western part of the country. According 
to Brian Eric Abrams (2006:24), ZANU-PF and the state ‘developed a clear 
message, sharp media campaign and a multi-layered military response to 
achieve its highly focused political goals.’ The violence was in reality an 
indication of how Ndebele particularism could not easily blend with a Shona 
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imagined nation and Shona triumphalism. This was indicated by the fact 
that while the policy of national reconciliation (uniting whites and blacks) 
endured until 2000, the national policy of unity (uniting blacks) collapsed 
in 1982 and was followed by ferocious civil war.
As clearly detailed in the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
(CCJP) and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)’s Report, Breaking the 
Silence: Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland 
and the Midlands, 1980-1989, the military operation that was orchestrated 
through deployment of the Fifth Brigade (Gukurahundi) became a bizarre 
combination of random killing of every Ndebele-speaker, hunting and killing 
of every PF-ZAPU supporter, raping of Ndebele women and girls, as well 
as abduction, torture, politicisation and attempts at forcing every Ndebele-
speaker to switch to the Shona language and then support ZANU-PF (CCJP 
& LRF 1997).17 Bhebe (2004b:15) had this to say about the roots of this 
violence:
Moreover, when people discuss our nationalist historiography they 
want to pour their worst venom on ZANU-PF and even forget the 
inevitability of our post-colonial civil war. Perhaps what was not 
inevitable were its excesses. But frankly, considering the way we had built 
our guerrilla armies, I again doubt whether a ZIPRA dominated army 
would have fought such a civil war in Mashonaland any different from 
the way ZANLA dominated Zimbabwe National Army fought the civil 
war in the Midlands and Matabeleland. I am aware of the destructive 
and brutal role of the Korean trained Gukurahundi, but are we certain 
that if we, as ZAPU, had won the elections, we would not have had 
our friends to train our own military units to destroy or tame former 
ZANLA forces. Rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU was simply too much 
and uncontrollable and only those who were on the periphery of our 
struggle deserve to misunderstand our post-colonial conflicts.
17 See also Alexander 1998:151-182 and Yap 2001.
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To some extent we accept the notion of the inevitability of a violent post-
colonial civil war pitting the former liberation movements and their former 
armies against each other. But there is need to posit that the inevitability 
of violence was underwritten by incompatibilities of Ndebele and Shona 
particularities. The violence was in a way symptomatic of the failure of a 
smooth blending of major ethnicities into a new national identity called 
Zimbabwe. The net effect of this was that violence was the only invitation 
card by which the Ndebele were invited into a Shona-imagined nation. 
Matabeleland had to be conquered and forced into part of Zimbabwe. That 
was the essence of the violence of the 1980s. PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua 
Nkomo only happened to be mistaken for symbols of Ndebele particularism. 
It is within this context that the impact of that violence has to be understood, 
particularly its role in the re-packaging of post-Gukurahundi politics in 
Matabeleland. The proclamation of uMhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi has 
summarised the forms of oppression emanating from Shona triumphalism 
in this way:
Marginalisation of the elected MPs of Matabelelanda. 
Instituting the reign of terror in Matabelelandb. 
Perpetrating ethnic cleansing against the people of Matabelelandc. 
Translocation of the economic resources of Matabeleland to d. 
Mashonaland
Reserving key jobs for Shona people in Matabelelande. 
Depriving the people of Matabeleland of education opportunities f. 
Retarding the cultural identity of the inter-cultural society of g. 
Matabeleland18  
This list encapsulates the core reasons for Ndebele resentment of the post-
colonial nation, as a Shona nation and post-colonial state serving Shona 
interests at the expense of Ndebele. The openly ethnic nature of the violence 
did not help matters as it made the Ndebele to be even more aware of 
their differences with the Shona. Lindgren (2005:158) noted that ‘people 
in Matabeleland responded by accusing Mugabe, the government and the 
‘Shona’ in general of killing the Ndebele’. Besides the Fifth Brigade atrocities 
instilling fear in Matabeleland and the Midlands, it heightened the victims’ 
18 The proclamation of uMhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi.
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awareness of being Ndebele and a sense of not being part of Zimbabwe.19 
The Unity Accord that was signed between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF on 
22 December 1987 was nothing less than a surrender document where 
the PF-ZAPU politicians threw in the towel and allowed PF-ZAPU to be 
swallowed by ZANU-PF.20 The bitterness and the memory of having lost 
family members, relatives and friends did not go away with the Unity Accord 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). 
Gukurahundi violence provoked radical Ndebele cultural nationalism as 
well as radical Ndebele politics that sometimes contested the whole idea of 
a unitary Zimbabwe state. This spirit manifested itself more openly in the 
formation of such radical Ndebele pressure groups as Vukani Mahlabezulu, 
Imbovane Yamahlabezulu, ZAPU 2000, as well as Mthwakazi Action Group on 
Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Matabeleland and Midlands and Mthwakazi 
People’s Congress (MPC).21 The first organisation focused more on revival 
of particularistic features of Ndebele culture and its main proponent was a 
novelist and academic, Mthandazo Ndema Ngwenya, who lost his life in a 
car accident on the Bulawayo-Harare Road. The second one concentrated 
on the issue of making those who perpetrated atrocities in the 1980s 
accountable for their sins. Such political figures as Enos Nkala and others, 
like Joseph Msika, were invited to explain to the people as to who gave the 
instructions for atrocities that affected the Ndebele of Matabeleland and 
the Midlands regions. The third one was a belated attempt to revive ZAPU 
following the death of Joshua Nkomo in July 1999. Its focus was repudiation 
of the Unity Accord which was interpreted as a surrender document that 
did not benefit the ordinary people of Matabeleland who suffered the 
consequences of ethnic violence. It accused the former ZAPU elite of selling 
19 In 2002, I carried out in-depth oral interviews in Bulawayo and Gweru about the Ndebele 
perceptions of the military and the results indicated that to the Ndebele, the military is a 
Shona-manned institution organised to kill those who are not Shona. 
20 For details on the Unity Accord see Chiwewe 1989.
21 These organisations came into being in the wake of the swallowing up of PF-ZAPU by 
ZANU-PF in 1987 and they tried to continue the work of such other earlier organisa-
tions as Ndebele National Movement, Matabele Home Society and Mzilikazi Family 
Association that were decentred by the rise of mass nationalism.
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out the people of Matabeleland for personal interests. The last two were a 
Diaspora phenomenon and they seek the establishment of an autonomous 
United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR) as the only way for the Ndebele people 
to realise self-determination.22 Umhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi must be 
understood within this politics and it defines itself in these terms:
Umhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi is being proclaimed as a freedom 
front to eradicate the oppression and suppression of the people of 
Matabeleland along tribal lines. Umhlahlo shall not be a political 
party and has no programme of contesting elections because of the 
people of Matabeleland have no freedom to govern themselves. Instead 
Umhlahlo is a community umbrella of the Inter-Cultural Society of 
Matabeleland which is committed to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It is non-violent community rooted 
umbrella of all the suppressed people regardless of partisan, ethnicity, 
creed, gender, class or age. Its membership is free to individuals, groups, 
institutions and associations who adhere to the principles of justice and 
humanitarianism.23 
The processes of Matabeleland politics are complex. As represented by 
Umhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi and other discreet groupings, the politics 
is both anti-colonial and anti-Shona domination. The young generation of 
political activists in Matabeleland are very sceptical of territorial nationalism 
as represented by ZANU-PF. The common perception is that ZANU-PF is a 
tribal party that survives on tribalism. This position was recently put forward 
by one regular columnist for New Zimbabwe.com (Mabhena 2006):
ZANU-PF is a party that is founded on splitting Zimbabwe into tribal 
groupings, i.e. Shona and Ndebele, whereby Shonas must provide 
national leadership. ZANU-PF, usually referred to as ‘The Party,’ has 
always had in their leadership deck Shonas taking up key leadership 
22 The emergence of these organisations may also be interpreted within the broader perspec-
tive of the rise of civil society at the end of the Cold War. 
23 The proclamation of uMhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi.
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positions with a lacing of Ndebele apologists making up the leadership 
elite numbers. The party had to enlist the services of Ndebele apologists 
to paint a picture of a government of national unity following the 
inconsequential ‘Unity Accord’ signed in December 1987. The Ndebele 
apologists were to behave like gagged guests at this party – ‘make no key 
decisions and above all don’t raise questions about the development of 
the other half of the country. 
The Matabeleland problem continues to impinge on and to pulsate within 
national politics and its salience led Khanyisela Moyo (2006) to state: ‘In 
my opinion, the Matabele question is critical and cannot be cursorily thrust 
aside. It should be subjected to an intellectual and candid debate’. Currently, 
the embers of the Matabeleland problem are burning more in the Diaspora 
than in Zimbabwe due to the Zimbabwe crisis that unfolded in 1997 sending 
millions of people into the Diaspora. The dimensions of the Matabeleland 
problem in the Diaspora have included Ndebele-speakers linking up via 
the internet and continuation of the project of fighting for recognition of 
Ndebele particularism. Already there exists an imagined autonomous United 
Mthwakazi Republic (UMR), complete with its own national flag and other 
ritualistic trappings of a state, if not a nation-state as a virtual community 
on the internet. A separate history is claimed together with appropriation 
of Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU and ZIPRA as the property and heritage of the 
Ndebele. What is at play is serious contestation of Shona triumphalism and 
hegemony. Mthwakazi proponents have openly declared that:
For our part, for our present generation, this Zimbabwe, and any 
attempts to maintain it in any guise in future as a state that includes 
uMthwakazi, is as false as it is silly. It is only part of the grand illusion 
of the whole Zimbabwe project created in 1980…What we have is their 
Zimbabwe, of Shonas, and a fledging state for uMthwakazi which we 
have called UMR. (Mthwakazi 2006) 
These radical separatist politics co-exists with an equally strong drive by 
some politicians from Matabeleland and the Midlands regions to close ranks 
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with such political organisations as the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), to fight for what they term a ‘New Zimbabwe’. These politicians still 
believe in the power of territorial nationalism and they define the problem 
as an issue of governance rather than ethnicity. Added to this constituency 
are the old guard ZAPU nationalists who have continued their membership 
in ZANU-PF despite being pushed to peripheral positions within the party 
and the government. All this indicates the depth of the complexities of 
Matabeleland politics and the lack of consensus within the region on the 
best way forward. 
Conclusion
What is beyond doubt is that what I have termed Ndebele particularism is 
a complex phenomenon that cannot be ignored in the imaginations of a 
post-crisis Zimbabwe. It is at the root of the problem of how two nations 
(Shona and Ndebele) with different pre-colonial histories and memories 
can be invited into one centralised state that masquerades as a state adhering 
to the Shona worldview. Ndebele particularism does not fit easily into this 
imagined nation and the state where Ndebele experiences, histories and 
heroes are subordinated to triumphant and hegemonic Shona history, if not 
completely ignored. The way the post-colonial state was abused by ZANU-PF 
in its drive to violently destroy Ndebele particularism set in motion the 
current Matabeleland politics of alienation, resentment and grievance 
that are combining to fuel the desire for a restoration of the pre-colonial 
Ndebele state. There is pervasive fear in Matabeleland that without a state 
of their own the Ndebele remain in danger of a repetition of Gukurahundi. 
The Ndebele people have come to realise that states are used as vehicles to 
suppress unwanted communities and hence their drive for their own state 
that will cater for their own national interests. 
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